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of	 new	 and	 used	 personal-vehicle	 fleets.	 All	 available	 vehicles	 compete	 directly,	 with	 demand,	





Automobiles dominate the U.S. transportation landscape. Much effort is put into the design of 
vehicles and the infrastructure they use, directly and peripherally. To understand and anticipate 
travel patterns, along with emissions, energy use, and gas tax revenues, transportation engineers and 
planners model vehicle ownership and use decisions. An appreciation of the near- and long-term 
effects of demographic, economic, and policy changes on vehicle fleet composition allows for more 
comprehensive planning. Many state, regional, and local transportation agencies must forecast the 
air quality, greenhouse gas contributions, and fuel tax implications of an evolving transportation 
landscape.  This paper tackles the simulation of vehicle purchase and re-sale decisions via an auction 
process among individual households in the market for vehicles (new and used).
If a modeler can identify measurable attributes of consumers and producers that propel the 
buying, selling, scrappage, and use of cars and trucks, they can predict the choices made at an 
aggregate or disaggregate level using microsimulation. Several researchers have attempted to do 
this (e.g., Musti and Kockelman 2011, Mohammadian and Miller 2003, and Berkovec 1985) with 
varying complexity and scope.  This work focuses on the choices made when households are offered 
the option to buy new or used personal vehicles, and the market clearing achieved by auction-
driven price fluctuations. Previous works either overlook the used-vehicle market completely or 
depend on some function for price changes due to vehicle aging.  This paper makes explicit the 
role of user preferences in vehicle price fluctuations through a market auction process, without 
strong assumptions about supply and demand.  The model framework is applied with 5,000 U.S. 
households to illuminate inputs needed and predictive results.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A number of researchers have sought to model automobile markets. The frameworks depend on 
the analyst purpose as well as available data and computing power. At the core of most model 
specifications is a logit choice function to simulate consumer purchases. The transaction models can 
be summed up as follows: “From a utility-maximizing perspective, when the household’s net utility 
gain from transacting exceeds a threshold, a transaction is triggered” (Mohammadian and Miller 
2003, p. 99).  
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Earlier work by Berkovec (1985) allowed an oligopoly of manufacturers to sell to consumers 
and consumers to sell to each other or to scrappers. Notably, this included a random repair cost 
function and a market-clearing requirement in each period. Berkovec and Rust (1985) focused on 
each household’s choice to keep or release a vehicle based on holding duration. These are much 
simpler than later models but laid useful groundwork, while identifying some important issues in 
model specification. Berkovec’s (1985) model achieved market clearing conditions when the supply 
from manufacturers and current stock matched the demand by consumers and scrappers.  To achieve 
this, he used a simple supply-demand function that adjusted price for each of 13 vehicle types, with 
demand summed over all consumers. This is the only model found that established market prices. 
He included devaluation in a vehicle’s “expected capital cost,” as a function of its current price 
and the previous model year’s current price without consideration of usage or other heterogeneous 
trends. In Berkovec and Rust (1985), the depreciation is a simple constant (20% fixed, annual), 
regardless of year or vehicle type.  
Musti and Kockelman (2011) and Mohammadian and Miller (2003) are the best examples of 
robust, recent models of the vehicle market. Musti and Kockelman (2011) simulated households in 
the Austin, Texas, region, with demographic and residential attributes evolving over time. There 
were many levels to their model, including population evolution, vehicle ownership, transaction 
decisions, and vehicle choice and use. The last sub-model also projected greenhouse gas emissions, 
but that was not part of the market portion of the simulation.  Each year every household had to 
acquire a vehicle, retire a vehicle, or do nothing. The period ended when this was completed.  No 
market clearing price mechanisms were simulated; exogenous prices were given based on current 
manufacturer suggested retail prices (MSRPs).  
Their transaction model quantified the utility of vehicles owned by each household and available 
new from manufacturers. Vehicle choice relied on a multinomial logit (MNL) model using stated-
preference survey results, neglecting past and current holdings. The households were heterogeneous 
in their attributes (socioeconomic and geographic) as well as their evolution. While their models 
simulated vehicle use (among the various fleet-evolution and market-focused models described 
here), they did not consider devaluation and maintenance at all. Conspicuously missing from their 
model was the buying and selling of used vehicles.
Mohammadian and Miller (2003) undertook a similar, MNL-driven simulation with fewer 
sub-models, but included an option to both release and acquire a vehicle. Used vehicles released 
by households in their model essentially vanished, and buyers could choose any model year they 
wanted, with prices given by exogenous market averages. To account for changes in utility as a 
result of evolving household attributes, the transaction model controlled for up/down changes in 
household size and number of workers (as opposed to these attributes’ absolute numbers), but lacked 
home-neighborhood, age, and gender information. Mohammadian and Miller’s (2003) choice model 
strongly depended on previous vehicle types and transaction decisions. Interestingly, they found that 
unobserved preference heterogeneity was not statistically significant after controlling for previous 
behaviors. This suggests that differences across decision makers may not be practically useful if 
information about their current and past vehicle holdings is known.  
Mueller and de Haan (2009) constructed a bi-level choice model for new vehicles, randomly 
presenting consumers a subset of choice alternatives. Notably, it contained a Markov process to carry 
prior-owned-vehicle attributes (by household) over for new-vehicle choice. Esteban (2007) created 
a model to investigate the fleet effects of scrappage subsidies. She focused on transaction decisions 
and found that “a subsidy can induce scrappage even if it pays less for a used car than its without-
subsidy price” (2007, p. 26). Since her work focused on national market dynamics, it provides 
little insight for household-level microsimulation. Emons and Sheldon (2002) gave a very different 
perspective in their implementation of a “lemons model,” focusing only on vehicle attributes, 
rather than owner attributes. They predicted inspection failures, representative of car quality, based 
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on duration of ownership. No studies in the literature appear to integrate this information with 
microsimulation of consumer choices.
Berry et al. (1995) presented a method for combined empirical analysis of preference functions, 
cost functions, aggregate consumer attributes, and product characteristics to derive price estimates, 
quantities, profits, and consumer welfare.  They found their model accurately reproduced actual US 
markets when changing one parameter at a time, ceteris paribus.  Though they only used aggregate 
inputs and outputs, their approach could be used to feed information to a microsimulation model 
like those previously mentioned. 
Auction Model Microsimulation
Though none of these market models used an auction method, such methods have advantages for 
pricing and vehicle selection. Products are auctioned, as suggested by Cassady (1967), if they 
have no standard value, such as antiques. Zhou and Kockelman (2011) used auctions to model 
real estate markets with various agents. If a property received no bids, the price fell by a certain 
(small) amount; with multiple bids, the price rose (by a similar amount).  The bidding ended when 
each property hit its (pre-set) minimum price, received a single bid, or hit its (pre-set) maximum 
price (with a winning buyer randomly selected). Properties in high demand from buyers’ experience 
price increases and those with little demand see prices fall.  At or below a minimum threshold 
price, sellers can be assumed to keep their property. This may be described as a type of alternating 
double auction market. (See “Auctioning and Market Pricing” section of this paper and Sadrieh 
1998, and Gibbons 1992 for more on these markets). Unlike Berkovec’s (1985) approach, Zhou and 
Kockelman’s (2011) auction did not require aggregate supply and demand equations.
Vehicle Depreciation, Lifespan, and Holding 
Greenspan and Cohen (1999) described an upward trend in vehicle lifespan, with the median age 
of U.S. personal vehicles just 10 years for 1960 models, and nearly 13 years for 1980 models. 
DesRosiers (2008) describes heterogeneity in longevity (in Canada) with over 50% of large pickup 
trucks from 1989 still registered 19 years later, while only 8.2% of subcompacts remain. He shows 
that the median age for all vehicle types is at least 14 years, with most over 16 years. The 2001 
(U.S.) National Household Travel Survey indicates that the average age of vehicles is 8.2 years. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (Lu 2006) analysis showed that a typical passenger 
car would travel a lifetime mileage of 152,137 miles, while light trucks would travel 179,954 miles. 
In terms of holding durations, Emons and Sheldon (2002) found new U.S. vehicles to be held by a 
household an average period of four to six years. 
Consumer Preferences and Decision Making 
Three-quarters of respondents in Musti and Kockelman’s (2011) survey placed fuel economy in 
their top three criteria for vehicle selection. However, fuel costs were not statistically significant 
in the corresponding revealed choice model. (This may be due to sudden changes in fuel price 
that happened after many of the owned vehicles were purchased.) While Espey and Nair (2005) 
found the opposite – that consumers did accurately value the savings from lower fuel cost. Bhat et 
al. (2008) suggested that people value fuel cost less than vehicle purchase cost, but with marginal 
statistical and practical significance. 
Bhat et al. (2008) undertook one of the most comprehensive vehicle-preference studies based 
on travel surveys in the San Francisco region. They estimated how vehicle type, size, age, and use 
relate to each owner’s socioeconomic attributes, as well as neighborhood attributes and the home’s 
general location within the region.  Specifically:
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• Older people were more likely to have older vehicles, and younger people were more likely 
to have newer vehicles;
• Households with higher incomes and/or more workers tended to own fewer older vehicles 
and used less non-motorized transportation;
• Households in higher density, mixed use, and urban areas held fewer trucks and vans;
• Households in neighborhoods with bike lanes used more non-motorized transportation;
• Race and gender affect vehicle holdings and use; and
• In general, less expensive, bigger (by luggage and seating capacities), more powerful, and 
lower emission vehicles are preferred, ceteris paribus.
Mohammadian and Miller (2003) predicted the “do nothing” (neither buy nor sell) transaction 
status with much higher accuracy than any other choice. They found that buy and sell transaction 
choices were not influenced by the same variables. For example, an increase in the number of 
household workers seemed to induce a purchase or trade but not reduce the chance of a disposal. 
However, an increase or decrease in household size improved the chances of trading and disposing, 
respectively, while not affecting the chances of a purchase.  
This work builds on these market and discrete choice concepts to provide a new method for 
simulation of an automobile market.  It draws on several specifications from Musti and Kockelman 
(2011) fleet simulations, incorporating certain beneficial features of Storchmann’s (2004) and 
Kooreman and Haan’s (2006) work. It adds an auction strategy for pricing of used cars not yet 
available in the literature.
MODEL SPECIFICATION
The model used here includes two MNL models in sequence to predict each household’s vehicle 
fleet from year to year.  The first is a once-a-year market entrance model to simulate a household’s 
decision to modify or maintain its “fleet” of personal vehicles. This choice model evaluates the 
probability that a household will choose to retire a vehicle, acquire a vehicle, or do nothing. 
The second MNL predicts which vehicle the purchasing/acquiring households will want, among 
available new and used vehicles.  This vehicle choice model runs many times each year, within an 
auction model, to re-evaluate choices under different price conditions until equilibrium is reached. 
The objective of this work is to explore the features of such a framework, and examine the results 
of different context assumptions.  The simulation described here was not calibrated as a whole, but 
rather constructed from previously calibrated models and empirical equations.  
Market Entrance and Vehicle Choice Models
The utility model parameters for the market entrance model are based on those from Musti and 
Kockelman’s (2011) transaction model, as given in Table 1.  The choices are “acquire,” “dispose,” 
or “do nothing” (which serves as the base case).  Since these are the only options in the data, a 
“trade” choice was not available, though it is highly desirable. Some parameter values required 
adjustment (as discussed in the Results and Conclusions section), since these choice models were 
calibrated in a different context. 
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Table 1: MNL Parameter Estimates for Annual Vehicle Transactions
Variable Coefficient T-Stat
Acquire (Buy) -1.8314 -7.33
Dispose (Sell) -3.7824 -8.96
Number of vehicles in the household x Dispose 0.4077 2.44
Number of workers in a house x Buy 0.2510 2.31
Female indicator x (Acquire, Dispose) -0.3303 -1.79
Maximum age of vehicle in household x (Acquire, 
Dispose) -0.0955 -4.63
Income of household x Do nothing -2.25E-06 -1.33
Log Likelihood at Constants -505.37
Log Likelihood at Convergence -448.65
Pseudo R2 0.3679
Number of households 640
(Source: Musti and Kockelman, 2011)
The MNL vehicle choice model estimates the systematic utility of each vehicle available in 
the market for each household. The model offers nine vehicle choices with distinct body types, fuel 
costs, and prices, representing the range of the most popular vehicles available in the U.S.  Each of 
these nine vehicle types were offered as new (with set prices and unlimited supply) and competed 
with any used vehicle put up by sellers.  Vehicle and household attributes serve as covariates in the 
utility expression (Table 2).  
The first nine vehicle (and household) attributes shown in Table 2 are not specifically related 
to used vehicles and so were taken from Musti and Kockelman’s (2011) vehicle choice model. In 
addition to these, four used-vehicle variables were added.  Musti and Kockelman’s (2011) model 
did not contain such variables, so these were derived based on other sources (Kooreman and Haan 
(2006) and Storcheman (2004), as discussed below.
The Used	 indicator x	 Income	class level coefficient was approximated such that the lowest 
income groups are more likely and the highest income groups are very unlikely to choose a used 
car.  The income groups were classified from 1 to 12 with 1 being the lowest (under $5,000) and 
12 being the highest (above $250,000).  At the lower income levels, this has a value in the utility 
equation close to the difference between two similar body types, making it slightly more probable 
that a buyer would switch from his/her optimal body type to a similar one if a reasonable used one is 
available.  This was done on a purely intuitive basis, because such used-vehicle data do not exist.  At 
high-income levels, a used car would decrease the utility at a value close to that expected between 
dissimilar body types, making a used car a very unlikely choice for a household making $200,000 
or more each year.
The next two variables (Price	new	x	10-5	x	Used	indicator and	Price	new	x	10-5	x	exp(age	´	δ)) 
are based on the price when new and correspond to loss of vehicle value/utility with vehicle age. 
This is assumed to be universal to all buyers in the market.  The values are based on Storcheman’s 
(2004) price depreciation equation, as discussed later.  Thus, the negative utility from vehicle aging 
should generally match the utility difference that comes with paying the initial auction price versus 
the new price.  They will not exactly cancel, however, because different income groups are assumed 




Table 2’s last variable involves a 100,000-mile (odometer reading) indicator with current price 
to reflect the nonlinear drop in vehicle value associated with this significant usage milestone.  The 
coefficient is such that the loss of utility will be that of 5% of its monetary value, as suggested by 
Kooreman and Haan (2006).
Table 2: Vehicle Choice Model Parameters
Variable Coefficient t-stat
Fuel cost -8.514 -2.83
Purchase price (current) x 10-5 -5.57 -3.94
Age of respondent less than 30 indicator x Midsize car 0.3627 2.28
HHsize greater than 4 indicator x SUV 0.8756 3.41
HHsize x Van 0.2895 4.66
Crossover sports utility vehicle (CUV*) -0.4148 -2.43
Luxury car -1.121 -3.51
Suburban x SUV 0.2632 1.32
Urban x Midsize car 0.1864 1.21
Used indicator x (Income class - 3)** -0.3333 -
Price new x 10-5 x Used indicator** 5.57 -
Price new x 10-5 x exp(age ´ δ)** -5.23 -
Over 100k miles indicator x Purchase price (current) x 10-5* -0.2785 -
Note:  * CUVs are SUVs with a unit-body car platform. Popular models include the Honda CR-V and Toyota RAV-4.
 ** denotes variables added to the model of Musti and Kockelman (2009). 
Auctioning and Market Pricing
In lieu of neglecting prices or referring to exogenous price functions, the model developed here 
uses an alternating double auction-based market pricing simulation, similar to that in Zhou and 
Kockelman (2011) and Sadrieh (1998) – and as described below, for prices of used vehicles (only). 
Unlike the transaction and vehicle choice models, the auction structure is not a direct simulation 
of the actions of buyers or sellers in the automobile market.  Clearly, the sale of used vehicles 
directly or through dealers does not have such an open bidding process.  Here, an auction bidding 
methodology is used to simulate prices, based on the preferences of individual buyers and offerings 
of actual sellers.
The market entrance model selects the (mutually exclusive) buyers and sellers participating in 
the market each year.  The vehicles consist of new vehicles (in unlimited supply, with fixed prices) 
and those to be sold by households making a sell transaction.  The buyers are the households making 
a buy transaction.  The rules are such that all buyers must buy an automobile, and all used vehicles 
(from sellers) must be bought, returned to the selling household, or scrapped.
The alternating double auction is a discrete-time version of the standard (“open outcry”) auction. 
It cycles or alternates between seller bids and buyer bids.  Initially, sellers offer their vehicles at an 
opening bid set at prices (P
0
), as described below.  Buyers bid at that price on vehicles chosen by the 
vehicle choice model (i.e., those offering maximum net utility, after reflecting initial offer prices). 
Buyers act independently, and may only bid on a single (new or used) vehicle at each stage.  There 
is no limit on the number of bids a vehicle can receive.  At the beginning of the second cycle, sellers 
make price adjustments based on the buyers’ bids.  The sellers will decrease and increase prices of 
all used vehicles in zero- and two-plus (buyer-) bidder situations, respectively, by a small increment 
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(assumed to be 1% of the vehicle model’s price new – or $200 for a $20,000 MSRP vehicle), while 
single-bid vehicles maintain their current price. The vehicle choice model then runs again, and all 
remaining buyers put in new bids on those vehicles offering them the greatest (random) utility gain. 
These cycles continue until all buy decisions have been executed.
If a vehicle’s price falls below the scrappage price, it is immediately taken off the market and 
cannot return. If a vehicle’s price reaches its maximum allowed price with more than one bidder, it is 
given, at that maximum price, to a randomly chosen bidder. A vehicle at maximum price is no longer 
evaluated by other bidders, but the winning bidder may choose to switch to a different vehicle as 









For the bidding to end, two conditions must be met: no vehicle may have more than one bidder 
and no vehicle may have zero bidders if it is at a price greater than its (exogenously set) minimum 
price. Similar to Zhou and Kockelman (2011), if a vehicle reaches its minimum price without 
bidders, it is returned to its owner. 
The opening auction prices (P
0
) of used vehicles are set using the logarithmic depreciation 




eα+dt.  Here, P
t
 is price at year t, P
new
 
is new price, and α and δ are depreciation parameters.  There is also an additional 5% price drop for 
vehicles past 100,000 miles, as implied by Kooreman and Haan (2006), and the minimum P
0
 is the 
scrappage price.  Though Storchmann’s (2004) study included regressions that were model- (and 
nation-) specific, a single number is used here for all models, for simplicity and because Storchmann 
(2004) did not include vehicles representing all body types.  Only U.S. coefficient values are applied 
here, as shown in Table 3. Table 3’s vehicle models were chosen by Kooreman and Haan because 
they are very common in the U.S. used-car market.  In this study, these values were assumed to be α 
=	-0.05 and δ =	-0.175.  It should be noted that the Civic and Accord are considered to have some of 
the lowest depreciation rates among all makes and models. (Lienert 2005, Consumer Reports 2010) 
Prices of new vehicles are set exogenously, based on MSRPs used in Musti and Kockelman (2011).
Table 3: Parameter Values for Price Depreciation 
  from Storchmann (2004), Pt= Pnew eα+dt
Vehicle Make & Model α δ
GM Cadillac Seville -0.14 -0.163
Toyota Camry -0.01 -0.168
Honda Accord 0.14 -0.191
Honda Civic -0.15 -0.172
The Simulation Program
A simulation program was written in MATLAB’s m-language, to mimic Austin households making 
new- and used-vehicle choices over 20 years. The program has a main layer that tracks households 
and vehicles over time, and a market–level layer that determines prices and vehicle selection in a 
given year, mimicking the layers of the logit models.  The main layer tracks the state of households 
and vehicles and contains the “market entrance” functions. This includes selecting vehicles and 
buyers for the market, and updating ownership and other information.  The market layer uses the 
vehicle choice model to determine purchases and runs until market clearance is achieved.
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Figure 1: Schematic of the Simulation
 
Figure 1 shows the basic flow in one year of the simulation.  In the market entrance model, 
households choose to bypass the market (do nothing), sell a vehicle in the market, or enter it as a 
buyer.  The vehicle choice model selects a vehicle in the household fleet to sell, and this vehicle 
is put into the market.  In the market, vehicles and households are run through the vehicle choice 
model to determine which automobiles households wish to buy.  After the market clears, the yearly 
update module places vehicles into their new (or old, if unsold) households and updates mileage 
and vehicle age information.  The mileage added on a vehicle in any given year varies by its current 
owner, who has an associated usage per year, which is given in input data. The yearly mileages are 
based on averages from the household data and are held constant through the simulation. 
The model was run for 20 year-long iterations on a fixed set of households.  These households’ 
attributes were not updated over time (to reflect aging individuals and the like), and no households 
are added or removed (to allow for more straightforward simulation).  Such updating is, of course, 
feasible and useful in the context of real-world applications but beyond the focus of this work.  The 
data used for simulation included 5,000 simulated households generated by duplicating the 637 
households (not including those with incomplete data) from Musti and Kockelman’s (2011) survey 
data. Use of 5,000 households allows for a market large enough to function but small enough to 
easily test. Table 4 provides a summary of these households’ attributes (and the specific respondent 
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Table 4: Summary of Simulated Households’ Attributes
Average Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.
Household Size 2.21 0 7 1.25
Number of Vehicles 1.61 0 5 0.87
Age of HH head (years) 36.8 20 70 15.0
Household Income ($/year) 86,271 5,000 250,000 67,048
Female Indicator 0.36 0 1 0.48
Number of Workers 1.46 0 5 0.85
Miles per Year per Vehicle 10,568 750 42,000 4,687
SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulation successfully ran through 20 years of market decisions among the 5,000 households 
in 25 to 40 minutes, with each year taking between 20 seconds and 10 minutes.  The bidding loops 
generally took between 20 and 500 iterations, but occasionally required more than 1,000.  This 
volatility can be greatly reduced by limiting repeated, similar-price steps, but was allowed here for 
simplicity.
Several tests were undertaken to examine the effects of changes in model parameters. One 
important adjustment was required in Musti and Kockelman’s (2011) market entrance model: The 
value of the coefficient on maximum age of a vehicle in the household’s fleet for the buy and sell 
options was negative (-0.0955), making it less likely that a household would get rid of a vehicle or 
buy a new one as its oldest vehicle aged. To address the issue of unreasonable holding durations 
and the resulting vehicle lifespans, a hazard function (for vehicle lifetimes) was added to randomly 
remove vehicles from households without selling them. This addition allows the model to account 
for irreparable, stolen, and destroyed vehicles (e.g., via collision or major mechanical failures), 
with the hazard (risk of vehicle loss) rising with vehicle age (i.e., probability=1-aeb*age-c), based on 
NHTSA statistics (Lu 2006).  While more detailed survey data may capture such effects, this ex-
ogenous function can fill in the gaps.  Selby (2011) describes these changes and variations in user 
inputs in detail. 
Table 5 compares the fleet mix in the high fuel-price and base fuel-price scenarios after 20 years 
of the simulation.  The increased gas prices (at $5, rather than $2.50, per gallon) result in share re-
ductions for large cars and all light trucks (CUVs, SUVs, pickups, and vans).  Small share increases 
were observed in compact and midsize cars, with the majority of the shift going to the subcompact 
class, which offers the most fuel efficient vehicle type modeled.
Since governments sometimes choose to induce car turnover (thereby improving fleet emissions 
or safety) by offering scrappage subsidies (e.g., the Obama Administration’s “Cash for Clunkers” 
program or those described in Esteban [2007]), such subsidies are an input parameter of interest. 
A simulation was done in which the scrappage incentive (per qualifying vehicle) was increased 
from $500 to $2,500 (for all vehicles). The new scenario encouraged an expected rise in vehicles 
sold for scrap and a drop in the numbers removed via the hazard function, as seen in Table 6. 
The average number of auction rounds fell by more than 50%, with vehicles exiting for scrappage 
more quickly.  On average, only one vehicle went unsold every two auctions when the subsidy was 
offered.  Additionally, used-car sales went down 12% (by about 475 vehicles), while new car sales 
were up 3% (by 225 vehicles).  There were slightly more (1.5%) total vehicles (held initially plus 
purchased during simulation) with the higher scrappage rate offered, and somewhat fewer (-2.2%) 
purchases made.  This may be the result of the removal of low-value cars that had been sold multiple 
times in the base case but scrapped early on in those with the higher subsidy.  The distribution of 
vehicles’ ages in the final simulation year (Year 20) did not change substantially between the cases. 
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Table 5: Model-Predicted Vehicle Holdings by Type After 20 Years





















Per Year Total Per Year Total
Buyers in Auction 557 11,146 545 10,897
Vehicles in Auction 201 4,023 203 4,053
Auction Rounds 346 6,914 154 3,081
Vehicles Unsold 2 47 1 10
Total Vehicles 15,294 15,517
New Vehicles Purchased 7,255 7,478
Used Vehicles Purchased 3,891 3,419
Vehicles Scrapped 85 624
Vehicles Removed by Hazard 8,250 7,808
Average Vehicle Age in Year 20 7.81 yrs 7.95 yrs
Figure 2 gives vehicle-age distributions at several time points over the simulation, for direct 
comparison with the NHTSA curves (Lu 2006) for cars and light trucks. It appears that, over the 
20-year period, the program is reshaping the synthetic distribution of 5,000 households’ vehicles 
into a smoother function. The rough peaks of the original data are removed by year 20, since those 
vehicles are all retired and have been replaced via a regular adoption of new vehicles. 
Important concerns when running a simulation over a long period of time are the system’s equi-
librium, encroachment on boundary conditions, and/or cyclical patterns that the program may enter. 
Fifty-year runs were performed to examine the program’s trajectory, and Figure 2 suggests that the 
model mimics the NHTSA curves (Lu 2006) rather well, which is heartening to see.
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Figure 2: Vehicle-Age Distributions for 20-Year and 50-Year Simulations
Note: NHTSA Light Truck Curve Omitted for Readability of the 20-year Image
These various simulations illustrate the framework’s flexibility, with results that highlight just 
a few of the comparisons that can be pursued.  Not only can fuel, scrappage incentives, vehicle 
attributes, and household inputs be changed, but modules can be added without recalibration to 
incorporate more behavioral sophistication, including household evolution and greenhouse gas 
emissions estimation.
CONCLUSIONS
This work’s results suggest significant potential of auction-style microsimulation for used- and new-
car market modeling, while indicating areas for model enhancements. The general modeling ap-
proach offers analysts the advantage of determining market prices without requiring explicit supply 
and demand functions. It also sets all prices and purchase choices simultaneously, for the entire 
set of market actors (buyers and sellers). This type of model is designed to mimic disaggregate 
decisions on supply and demand, and microsimulation allows one to incorporate nearly limitless 
complexity in behavioral processes.  With a fluid market and representative groups of buyers and 
vehicles, the prices and choices may tend toward an optimal set. 
The approach taken here, to reflect transactions of used vehicles, extends the approaches taken 
in previous works – which either ignore such vehicles (e.g., Musti and Kockelman 2011) or assume 
an external supply of such vehicles (e.g., Mohammadian and Miller 2003). In this model, available 
used vehicles were compared directly to new vehicles by buyers. By comparing sale vehicle options 
directly, the model allows individual vehicles to have unique characteristics and avoids the assump-
tion that every model year of a vehicle is for sale in a market. The auction structure sets prices based 
on the availability of vehicles and the individual preferences of people in the market. Prices and 
decisions thus react to market conditions such as changes in gas prices. With double gas prices, the 
model showed the subcompact’s share jumping by 10% and the share of all truck types falling by 
1% to 5%.  
This simulation also suggests some opportunities for model enhancement. First and foremost, 
households should also be allowed to sell and buy vehicles in the same year – a feature not currently 
available due to lack of this choice in the survey from which the data is sourced.  Consideration 
of budgetary constraints that many may be under when selecting a vehicle to pursue (and making 
an offer on that vehicle) would also improve its realism.  The market entrance model populates the 
market with vehicles and buyers based on existing household and fleet attributes, while recognition 
of actual vehicle prices and availability in the new and used vehicle markets should prove more re-
alistic. Robust data collection would encompass the current holdings and future plans of households, 
as well as the supply and pricing of vehicles. A shift in the conditions of the new and used markets 




The model used here also provides a history of prices, trades, and other information as outputs 
but does not use such information itself.  A more sophisticated approach could incorporate it into 
subsequent years’ market entrance decisions and pricing schemes.  Previous information can pro-
vide a starting point for the current year.  This would give some measure of continuity, a realistic as-
sumption, from year to year.  The effects of new vehicle price negotiation and credit availability may 
also be useful in future models.  The framework presented here is quite flexible, and much can be 
added without substantive changes, including the evolution of households (e.g., the number, ages, 
and incomes of household members) and new vehicles (the fuel economy, price, and reliability).
As seen in the results, scrappage prices can affect market and vehicle holdings, with 3% more 
new cars sold and 12% fewer used vehicles purchased under a higher scrappage incentive. In addi-
tion to the price floor for scrappage, a hazard function was used to randomly remove vehicles as they 
age. This permits early and owner-unexpected exits/losses of vehicles due to a serious crash or other 
situations. Ideally, this loss should be better integrated with other market decisions (like vehicle use 
and age) or removed in favor of a more robust market calibration that more clearly models used-car 
behaviors. Predicting the price accurately depends somewhat on starting at the right point and a 
great deal on properly calibrating and quantifying the valuation of wear on a vehicle.
Including market pricing and used automobiles is a complicated but presumably central part of 
modeling a population’s evolving vehicle fleet. This paper provides a framework for doing so and 
requires relatively few parameters for simulation. Additional work is necessary to add robustness 
and further empirical calibration of all model components.  
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